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Summary
Patient autonomy has been a frequently discussed issue since the 1960s. Nearly all bioethical works stress 
the necessity of respect for the patient’s autonomy. For many years now, a conscious consent of the patient to 
medical treatment has been fundamental for medical ethics. The patient’s acceptance of treatment is a confir-
mation of their autonomy in this area. From the moment autonomy became a fundamental issue in the doctor–
patient relationship, the concept has been given numerous definitions. This article provides a number of sug-
gestions of how to understand the concept of autonomy. However, there is a vital elementary question: does 
autonomy apply to all patients to the same degree? Are patients on psychiatric wards, patients with alcohol or 
drug addiction and patients serving a jail sentence entitled to the same extent of autonomy as others? Regard-
less of whether they are capable of undertaking, with the help of their doctor, a course of medical treatment, or 
whether they are capable of making conscious decisions relating to their health and needs. Where are the lim-
its of their autonomy? To summarize, the article argues that a paternalistic approach of doctors to their patients 
is dangerous and that there is a need to reflect on the scope of autonomy of patients on psychiatric wards.
patient autonomy, bioethics, paternalism
Among the questions accompanying the devel-
opment of bioethics, patient autonomy is consid-
ered of utmost importance. This rather complex 
problem is ambiguously interpreted, especial-
ly in the case of patients on psychiatric wards.
When investigating the origin of bioethics 
it was necessary to look back to the 1960s, as it 
was the time of rapid development and chang-
es in biomedicine (kidney dialysis, transplanta-
tion, contraceptive pill, artificial respirator, pre-
natal diagnosis). Scientific development was ac-
companied by broad social and cultural chang-
es. Before 1967 universities did not undertake 
systematic research on the bioethical reflection. 
However, these problems were recognized in 
Catholic higher schools and also at papal uni-
versities in Rome, within the so-called “pastoral 
medicine”. In 1967, as one of the first universi-
ties in the USA, the State Pennsylvania Univer-
sity opened the Department of Human Sciences 
for students of medicine and from then on theo-
retical and practical medicine has been submit-
ted to ethical assessment, i.e. in view of its con-
formity with a particular axiological system.
For many years the basis of medical ethics has 
been the conscious consent of the patient to med-
ical treatment. Without it a great part of medical 
services would have been neither ethical nor le-
gal [1]. Patient consent is the basis and confirma-
tion of their autonomy. A strong appeal to con-
scious consent has begun after two fundamen-
tal events: the first was the Nuremberg trial in 
1946–47 against 20 Nazi physicians and 3 admin-
istrative military officers accused of organizing 
and conducting criminal experiments on pris-
oners and citizens of conquered countries. In its 
grounds for the judgments, the Nuremberg Tri-
bunal listed ten basic rules of conducting medi-
cal experiments. Article 1 of the code (known as 
the Nuremberg Code) stressed the need for vol-
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untary consent of potential participants in an ex-
periment. Since then, requirements concerning 
gaining voluntary consent have become stand-
ard. In 1972 that obligation was included on the 
Patient’s Card by the American Hospital Associ-
ation. Bioethics, especially in America in the six-
ties and seventies, was dominated by the notion 
of the patient’s autonomy. It may have resulted 
from the atmosphere of those times: contestation 
and counterculture, negation of authorities and 
distrust of the predominant conception of pater-
nalism. Already in 1954 Joseph Fletcher assumed 
in his book Medicine and Morals that the idea of 
personal choice is the most important moral val-
ue. In the writings of this American bioethicist, 
autonomy was mainly seen as the right to self-
determination.
The notion of autonomy already appeared 
in ancient Greece. An autonomous human be-
ing means a person politically and thus legal-
ly free (i.e. not a slave). Literally, this notion can 
be translated as “self-governing”. However, that 
idea gained moral significance in the 19th century 
due to discussions around Immanuel Kant’s phi-
losophy. The notion of autonomy appeared in 
his Justification of Moral Metaphysics and The Cri-
tique of Practical Reason. According to Kant, every 
violation of a person’s autonomy is at the same 
time violation of their humanity, when a human 
being is treated as a thing. Kant’s view originat-
ed from deontological ethics, which holds that 
the determinant of a deed’s morality is a fulfill-
ment of the moral obligation to treat a human 
being as an autonomic subject. It is in fact an un-
compromising view.
Kant’s famous text Answering the Question: 
What is Enlightenment? of 1784 that prompted 
the human race to leave its minority, suggest-
ed that the motto of an illuminated so of age 
and autonomic human being should become the 
courage to use one’s own reason. Since Kant’s 
time, autonomy has almost become synony-
mous with human dignity and an internal val-
ue in any system declaring its serious approach 
to respect for human beings. However, though 
the notion of autonomy has considerably grew 
in importance, it is still at best unclear. Accord-
ing to Joel Feinberg, its ambiguity is connect-
ed with the application of the term “autonomy” 
in different contexts,1 though he acknowledged 
that those applications are closely related when 
used for individuals. Autonomy may relate to 
the ability to self-control, which can be devel-
oped, or to the actual state of self-governing and 
its values, or to an independent power to self-
governing absolute within our own moral lim-
its. It should be observed that the term “auto-
nomic” corresponds with the term “independ-
ent”, able to support oneself, to control one’s 
own life and be responsible for one’s own de-
cisions. Thus, the central meaning appears to 
be the self-sufficiency of the subject, and Rob-
ert Paul Wolff are of considerable significance 
for contemporary philosophy debating the no-
tion and position of autonomy of the individu-
al. The first places himself among the continua-
tors of Kant’s tradition of rational ethics, based 
on at least four assumptions: (a) it is reason that 
describes our moral choices, (b) the existence of 
reason is a necessary factor for being human, (c) 
everyone, irrespective of our position, must ac-
cept the recommendation of reason under the 
threat of exclusion from the community of in-
telligent individuals, (d) free choice means au-
tonomy, that is following one’s own rules based 
on the acceptance of some reasonably justified 
imperatives. Finally, those imperatives are for-
mulated. With imperatives as the system’s main 
principles Kant’s ethics was the ethics of obliga-
tion. Rawls does not go so far. His ethics is of 
a formal shape. Here, the rules of justice form 
a kind of categorical imperative. They neither 
choose the aims nor decide on the arrangement 
of good but not limiting our freedom they can 
apply to us irrespectively of our aims. Howev-
er, it is up to us whether we choose to submit 
to them. Rawls is convinced that in our life we 
should follow well thought-out plans independ-
ent from hazardous circumstances and claims 
that autonomic individuals should govern their 
lives in accordance with justice.
Robert Wolf, describing the principles of au-
tonomy, wrote: “An autonomic man does not 
submit to the will of another man. He can fol-
low the other’s orders but not because of being 
ordered. (p. 14)” [3] Thus, an autonomic activ-
1 Article 32 Regulation of December 5, 1996. On the profession of medical doctor and dentists (Official Gazette of 
2011, number 277, item 1634 with later adjustments).
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ity is defined by the subject. So when we are ill 
and submit to medical treatment we cast away 
our autonomy, and that is obvious and justi-
fied. The problem of autonomy is an example 
of intellectual self-sufficiency. However, Wolf 
is right when declaring: “In the contemporary 
world there exist considerable, maybe even im-
possible to overcome obstacles to gain the total 
and rational autonomy. (p. 17)” [3].
The notion of autonomy has been brought up 
in the political and legal context as well as the 
medical one. Difficulties connected with that 
issue were accurately characterized by Gerald 
Dworkin [4]. He wrote that describing a per-
son as autonomic we state, among other things, 
that they are not an uncritical conformist who 
easily adapts to the dominant fashion and, to 
be accepted by a person or a community, easily 
adopts their views and behavior. Such an indi-
vidual’s inclinations, opinions and ideas as well 
as moral models are their own if in any way they 
influence the person’s behavior. Dworkin de-
fines autonomy in the following short formu-
la: autonomy means authenticity and independ-
ence. The authenticity of a person is decided by 
their attitude towards factors shaping their be-
havior. The list of meanings of the term auton-
omy is rather long: among others, there is the 
freedom of acting, sovereignty of individual, 
independence, responsibility, critical refection, 
knowledge of one’s affairs.
Respect for patient autonomy is a fundamen-
tal justification of obtaining their assent to med-
ical treatment. Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. 
Childress in Principles of Medical Ethics, a book 
that in the 1970s was regarded as a classic and 
compulsory reading for all bioethicists – indi-
cated four principles on which medical ethics 
should be based. Among them is respect to-
wards the patient. In the very beginning, when 
discussing autonomy, the authors recall exam-
ples connected with the difficulty of its applica-
tion. They write about patients addicted to al-
cohol and those on psychiatric wards: “The pa-
tients of psychiatric wards requiring care and ac-
knowledged legally incompetent are entitled to 
such autonomic activities as for example choice 
of a particular dish, resignation form a medic-
ament, a telephone talk with acquaintances. 
(p. 132)” [5]. According to the authors, an au-
tonomic activity is an activity that can be un-
dertaken by everybody who acts intentionally, 
with understanding and without outside influ-
ence determining their deeds. The first condi-
tion is constant: acting either is or is not inten-
tional. The next two conditions, understanding 
and nonexistence of outside influence determin-
ing an act, can be fulfilled to a greater or lesser 
degree (for example, the independence of chil-
dren or elderly). So, finally, “an action can be 
considered autonomic if we are satisfied that its 
performer understood its meaning in a sufficient 
degree and that he/she did not act under outside 
influence. (p. 134)” [5]. To have some autonomy 
does not mean to be accorded respect as an auto-
nomic person. The obligation of respect towards 
a patient’s autonomy does not include those ob-
viously not autonomic, and such is the case of 
many patients on psychiatric wards. Here anoth-
er term should be recalled: competence.
A competent decision is a decision we are re-
sponsible for. However, it should be added that 
a patient is competent to make a decision if they 
can understand the content of information trans-
ferred to them, can assess it and are able to com-
municate with the community. When the patient 
does not have those abilities lack of competence 
may be presumed. Those tested as incompetent 
should be treated paternalistically. Decisions on 
behalf of those lacking autonomy or only partly 
autonomic patients are made by their attorneys. 
Immanuel Kant did not see that paternalistic is-
sue towards non-autonomic or partly non-auto-
nomic patients.
If a patient’s actions are not a result of their au-
tonomic choice, the interference of medical staff 
should be regarded as paternalism (according to 
the definition of the term “paternalism” in the 
Oxford Dictionary). In spite of his reluctant at-
titude to paternalism, J.S. Mill thought that in-
terference into the life of another human being 
is sometimes justified. In his essay “About Free-
dom” he wrote that the right to freedom is be-
ing taken away from “children, the insane and 
individuals in state of preoccupation not allow-
ing them for consideration. (p. 257)” [6]. Thus 
only a person of reasonable behavior and abili-
ty to choose can be regarded autonomic. Accord-
ing to Mill, limiting the activities of people with 
mental illness would not constitute paternalism.
Bioethicists Beauchamp and Childress wrote 
about two forms of paternalism: strong and 
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weak (Feinberg labelled it as hard and soft pa-
ternalism) [7]. The first relies on limiting the au-
tonomy of a person who has the ability to self-
decide (that form is unacceptable). The second 
bases on others deciding for a person lacking au-
tonomy. Where there is no autonomy, there is no 
violation. However, the autonomy of a particu-
lar person (as well as their competence) is not 
a permanent factor. It deteriorates in final phas-
es of sickness and then returns. Beauchamp and 
Childress recall the example of Catherine Lake, 
suffering from hardening of arteries, who partly 
lost her understanding and memory. That state 
was not permanent. There were periods when 
she was mentally able and behaved rational-
ly. Still, she was placed in a psychiatric institu-
tion as mentally unwell and not able to self-de-
fense. The patient did not consent to her stay in 
the psychiatric hospital. When in court she ex-
plained her reasons rationally. Still, the Ameri-
can court of appeal decided to place her in a psy-
chiatric institution, reasoning that “she could be 
a danger to herself”. She was treated as a person 
without autonomy.
John Rawls, an American philosopher draw-
ing to a great extent on Kant’s as well on Dwor-
kin’s philosophy, propagated a form of limit-
ed paternalism. Persons of incomplete autono-
my are not able to make rational decisions. Pa-
tients with serious psychotic conditions cannot 
decide on their medical treatment. In such cas-
es the soft form of paternalism applies. Howev-
er, some form of harder paternalism (compulso-
ry hospitalization, compulsory treatment) may 
also be considered.
American bioethics has been shaped by the lib-
eral and individualistic tradition, hence its fo-
cus on a person’s autonomy. Renee C. Fox stat-
ed that it was the American way of perceiving 
the world, the stress on the individualistic val-
ues and the rights of an individual that inspired 
bioethics, first of all declaring the absolute value 
of a patient’s autonomy. According to Fox, the 
principle of autonomy obtained such a great im-
portance thanks to the Anglo-American analyt-
ic philosophy that paved the way to the Ameri-
can model of bioethics [8].
The model presented here assumes the com-
petence equality of the doctor and the patient 
able to decide for themselves and independent-
ly establish moral priorities. Thanks to doctor–
patient cooperation, the unanimity of aims is 
facilitated. However, some critics comment on 
the differences appearing between the subjects: 
the patient needs help and has only a limited 
amount of knowledge that the doctor possess-
es. The dynamics of the patient’s decision-mak-
ing abilities may change (especially in the case 
of psychiatric patients). Such abilities are some-
times selective. The patient is able to decide in 
one matter and not in another. Thus, there ap-
peared a group of bioethicists who concentrate 
not on the patient’s autonomy and his move-
ments but on anther task: the patient’s well-be-
ing. The concept of Edmund D. Pellegrino and 
David C. Thomasma presented in their joined 
work For the Patient’s Good [9] is based on the 
declaration that the patient–doctor relationship 
relies on a kind of covenant agreement and has 
one aim only: the needs of the patient. That is 
why the doctor should be first of all led by the 
principle of doing good – acting in the best as-
sumed interest of the patient. The absolute dic-
tate of patient autonomy has been questioned. 
The authors declare that the patient’s autono-
my is already sufficiently limited by their sick-
ness. It would be worth developing this train of 
thought since it appears to be of special interest 
for doctors in psychiatric institutions. Of course, 
the method of fulfilling the patient’s needs has 
been assumed in advance by the doctor decid-
ing what is good for the patient. The principle 
of the doctor’s good will (virtue of benevolence) 
results from the standards accepted in a particu-
lar community bound by the same tradition and 
the same vision of a good life.
In 1984, Mark Siegler founded the MacLean 
Center for Clinical Medical Ethics at the Univer-
sity of Chicago. It was the first American pro-
gram (practical everyday problems in medicine) 
teaching ethics to medical doctors on real cas-
es. This conception criticized the bioethics for 
its remoteness from medical practice. According 
to Siegler, it is the reality that has the first-rate 
meaning in understanding the ethical aspects of 
medical decisions. When looking at a collection 
of cases and explicit opinions concerning them, 
one can apply understanding per analogiam.
There are a great many bioethical theories. 
As it can be seen in this very short summary, 
the term “patient autonomy” has been accept-
ed neither unanimously nor in all cases. In 1995 
 Patient autonomy on a psychiatric ward 17
Archives of Psychiatry and Psychotherapy, 2016; 3: 13–17
Poland passed an act of psychical health pro-
tection, which does not however exclude the 
breaches of patient autonomy. Exact tests deter-
mining the level of the patient’s competence are 
necessary. Still, as Marta Lang writes: “accord-
ing to the Polish act on psychical health protec-
tion in the case of admittance of an unwilling 
patient to a psychiatric institution the test of his 
competence is not the most important. What ap-
pears fundamental are the utilitarian factors – 
minimization of harm to self or others in case 
of the patient’s refusal of medical treatment 
(p. 118)” [10]. This act definitely prefers strong 
“paternalism”, since the most important condi-
tions are those concerning health and life pro-
tection. Neither autonomy nor consciousness 
of the patient are really included, and nor is re-
spect for patient’s privacy considered. On May 
21, 2009 regulations including the Ombudsman 
for Patients’ Rights were introduced and only 
in those can one find the following statement: 
“patient’s rights for his privacy must be respect-
ed”. We could widely analyze what the patient 
is and is not entitled to in the psychiatric institu-
tions, but respect is most needed by patients eve-
rywhere. Everyday experience both commands 
and bans resulting from legal regulations. A pa-
tient who is not informed about their rights and 
is not explained the reasons of treatment, who 
is not asked for consent, is aware of some lim-
itation of their autonomy. Such a situation of-
ten causes frustration, which sometimes turns 
into aggression. By informing the patient on the 
reasons and procedures undertaken the medical 
staff emphasizes that they are still due respect.
The ancient maxim “the most important for 
a medical doctor is his duty to act for the patient’s 
benevolence (salus aegroti suprema lex esto)” has 
been embedded in the Medical Code of Ethics 
concerning the doctor–patient relationship.
DISCLAIMER
I am a philosopher who is interested in bioeth-
ical issues, therefore the article focused on philo-
sophical literature. I am familiar with it and I use 
it in my work with students. I have no access to 
research with patients exposed to paternalistic 
treatment or patients whose autonomy was at-
tempted to be respected.
A philosopher most often will not give une-
quivocal answers, but will only suggest the di-
rection of reflections to be inspired. I hope this 
is what this article has achieved.
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